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Abstract 
 
Context: Rising drug prices are putting pressure on health-care budgets. Policymakers are 
assessing how they can save money through generics. 
 
Methods: We compared generic drug prices and market shares in 13 European countries, 
using data from 2013, to assess the amount of variation that exists between countries. To 
place these results in context, we reviewed evidence from recent studies on the prices and use 
of generics in Europe and the U.S. We also surveyed peer-reviewed studies, academic books, 
and grey literature published since 2000 to: (1) outline existing generic drug policies in 
European countries and the U.S., (2) identify ways to increase generic drug use and to 
promote price competition among generic drug companies, and (3) explore barriers to 
implementing reform of generic drug policies, using historical examples from the U.S. as a 
case study. 
 
Findings: The prices and market shares of generics vary widely across Europe. For example, 
prices charged by manufacturers in Switzerland are, on average, more than 2.5 times those in 
Germany, and more than six times those in the U.K. The proportion of prescriptions filled 
with generics ranges from 17% in Switzerland to 83% in the U.K. By comparison, the U.S. 
has historically had low generic drug prices and high rates of generic drug use (84% in 2013), 
but has in recent years experienced sharp price increases for some off-patent products. There 
are policy solutions to address issues in Europe and the U.S., such as streamlining the generic 
drug approval process and requiring generic prescribing and substitution where such policies 
are not yet in place. The history of substitution laws in the U.S. provides insights into the 
economic, political, and cultural issues influencing the adoption of generic drug policies. 
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Conclusions: Governments should apply coherent supply- and demand-side policies in 
generic drug markets. An immediate priority is to persuade more physicians, pharmacists, 
and patients that generic drugs are bioequivalent to branded products. Special-interest groups 
continue to obstruct reform in the U.S. and Europe. 
 
Policy points 
 
 Our study indicates there are opportunities for cost savings in generic drug markets in 
Europe and the U.S. 
 Regulators should make it easier for generic drugs to reach the market. 
 Regulators and payers should apply measures to stimulate price competition among 
generic drug makers and to increase generic drug use. 
 To meaningfully evaluate policy options, it is important to analyze historical context 
and understand why similar initiatives failed previously. 
 
Key words: generic drugs; health expenditures; pharmaceutical policies; prices  
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Background 
 
Rising drug prices are putting pressure on health-care budgets.1,2  Drugs account for 
sizable shares of health-care spending in rich countries, with costs of new treatments for 
diabetes,3 multiple sclerosis,4 rheumatoid arthritis,5 various cancers,6-9 and dermatological 
conditions10 increasing. There are many reasons, including aggressive pricing strategies by 
manufacturers6 and adoption of greater numbers of orphan and personalized drugs with high 
price tags.11,12  Governments are responding by looking at ways to negotiate lower prices for 
patented drugs13 and to expand the use of health technology assessments to ensure medicines 
are given to those who will benefit most.14 Policymakers are also assessing how they can save 
money through generics. 
Generic drugs are bioequivalent replicas of brand-name drugs, containing the same 
active ingredients and with identical quality, safety, and efficacy profiles.15-18 Any differences 
are limited to inactive ingredients, like coloring, flavoring, and stabilizing agents. Generics 
can, in theory, be sold for a fraction of the price of brand-name drugs for two reasons. First, it 
is relatively cheap to bring a bioequivalent product to market. Second, the market for the drug 
typically already exists, significantly reducing marketing expenses.19 
The cost-saving potential of greater generic drug use makes it an attractive option for 
policymakers, especially as many blockbuster drugs have come off patent in the last decade, 
with more soon to follow. Notably, the cholesterol-lowering drug rosuvastatin (Crestor) — 
one of the best-selling medicines of all time — lost market exclusivity in the U.S. and many 
European countries in 2016.20 
We have four objectives. First, we compare generic drug prices and market shares in 
13 European countries, using data from 2013, to assess the amount of variation that exists 
between countries. To place these findings in context, we review recent studies on prices and 
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use of generic drugs in Europe and the U.S. Second, we outline existing generic drug policies 
in European countries and the U.S. Third, given issues identified in the earlier parts, we 
explore possible measures to increase usage of generics and to stimulate price competition 
among generic drug makers. And, fourth, we analyze obstacles to improving generic drug 
policies, using a historical example from the U.S. as a case study.  
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Data and methods 
 
Dataset 
 
We selected 13 European countries with different generic drug policies: Germany, 
France, U.K., Spain, Italy, Poland, Switzerland, Netherlands, Greece, Portugal, Belgium, 
Sweden, and Denmark (listed in order of pharmaceutical market size).21 For each country, we 
obtained IMS Health data on the 2013 sales of 200 off-patent active ingredients, available in 
3,156 strength-form combinations. These were the most-prescribed off-patent active 
ingredients in Europe that year, according to IMS Health data. Appendix 1 shows a list of the 
active ingredients. Sales were recorded in terms of volume and monetary value. 
Volumes were measured in number of doses, which IMS Health sometimes refers to 
as “standard units.” IMS Health defined the amount in a single dose of each product, which 
could be one tablet, 5 mL of liquid, one vial, and so forth.22 We excluded 129 products 
(4.1%, 129/3,156) for which there was no information on dosage. 
Monetary values were measured in euros based on yearly average exchange rates.23 
These figures were calculated by multiplying the number of packs sold by the price of each 
product, excluding value-added taxes. This was done using ex-manufacturer and retail prices 
separately. Ex-manufacturer prices were those charged by manufacturers to wholesalers, 
while retail prices were those charged by pharmacists to patients or insurers. Appendix 2 
includes further details on the calculations. 
The dataset lacked certain information. First, it excluded generic drugs sold in 
hospital pharmacies, biosimilar products, off-patent originator drugs, and parallel-traded 
generics. Second, retail data were unavailable for the Netherlands and the U.K. Finally, the 
sales data did not reflect confidential rebates and discounts.  
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Price indexes 
 
We calculated Laspeyres indexes to compare drug prices in three steps.24-30  
First, for each of the 200 active ingredients, we calculated the average price per dose 
by dividing the total sales across form-strength combinations by the number of doses sold. 
For instance, omeprazole was sold in France as 10-mg and 20-mg capsules. The ex-
manufacturer sales of these drugs amounted to roughly €88.5 million and 450 million doses. 
Accordingly, the average price per dose of omeprazole (Prilosec) was €0.197 (88.5/450). We 
calculated the ex-manufacturer and retail prices of each active ingredient. 
Second, we identified a subset of 80 active ingredients prescribed in all 13 countries. 
This common sample accounted for between 46% and 72% of total generic drug sales in 
every country but the U.K. (25%). Table 1 shows descriptive statistics on the generic drug 
markets. 
Third, we calculated Laspeyres indexes using weights from a base country, in this 
case Germany, since it is the largest drug market in Europe by revenue. The rationale behind 
weighted indexes is that prices of highly-consumed active ingredients should be given greater 
consideration. The indexes are calculated as  
  
𝐼𝐿 =
∑ 𝑝𝑖
𝑐𝑞𝑖
𝑏𝑛
𝑖=1
∑ 𝑝𝑖
𝑏𝑞𝑖
𝑏𝑛
𝑖=1
 ∙ 100 
 
where p is the price of active ingredient i in the comparator country (c) or the base country 
(b), and q is the corresponding quantity (in doses). The base country is assigned a value of 
100. 
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The Laspeyres results are interpreted as price ratios. For instance, an index value of 
140 for country X means that prices are, on average, 40% higher there than in the base 
country (Germany). Conversely, a value of 60 indicates that prices are, on average, 40% 
lower in country X. Because we restricted our analysis to a common sample of drugs, the 
indexes give information on how prices compare across all countries. In other words, if 
values of 140 and 80 are observed for countries X and Y, respectively, it indicates that prices 
are, on average, 75% higher in country X than in country Y (140/80). 
 
Policy analysis 
 
To place the price-index results in context, we first summarized evidence from recent 
studies on the prices and use of generic drugs in Europe and the U.S. We then surveyed peer-
reviewed studies, academic books, and grey literature published since 2000 to: (1) describe 
current generic drug policies in Europe and the U.S., (2) identify potential solutions to 
increase generic drug use and to spur competition among generic manufacturers, and (3) 
explore barriers to the introduction of generic drug policies, using the history of substitution 
laws and bioequivalence regulation in the U.S. as a case study.  
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Generic drug market shares and prices in Europe and the U.S. 
 
Table 1 shows the proportion of prescriptions filled with generics in 13 European 
countries. The percentages were low, i.e., less than 40%, in Switzerland (17%), Italy (19%), 
Greece (20%), France (30%), Belgium (32%), and Portugal (39%). They were moderate, i.e., 
40% to 60%, in Sweden (44%), Spain (47%), Denmark (54%), and Poland (57%), and high, 
i.e., greater than 60%, in the Netherlands (70%), Germany (80%), and the U.K. (83%). 
 
Price-index results 
 
Figure 1 compares ex-manufacturer prices in each country. The figure shows wide 
variation in prices. For example, Swiss ex-manufacturer prices were, on average, more than 
2.5 times German ones, and more than six times British ones. 
Figure 2 compares retail prices in 11 European countries. The spread between the 
Swiss and German retail prices was smaller than the difference between the ex-manufacturer 
prices. Retail prices in Portugal, Spain, and Belgium were lower than in Germany, whereas 
the opposite was true at the ex-manufacturer level. Retail prices include distribution costs 
(i.e., transport, processing, and storage) and markups charged by wholesalers and pharmacies. 
Table 2 shows the ex-manufacturer prices of seven of the most consumed products in 
the sample. Atorvastatin (Lipitor) and simvastatin (Zocor) are cholesterol-reducing drugs; 
amlodipine (Norvasc) is a calcium channel blocker used to treat high blood pressure and 
coronary heart disease; metformin (Glucophage) is an anti-diabetic medication; and 
esomeprazole (Nexium), omeprazole (Prilosec), and pantoprazole (Protonix) are proton-pump 
inhibitors used to treat heartburn and related conditions. Prices of all seven products differ 
among countries. For instance, the price per dose of omeprazole was 30 times greater in 
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Switzerland than in the U.K. (€0.811 vs. €0.027). Even after excluding Greece and 
Switzerland, the two countries which generally had the highest prices, there were large price 
discrepancies.  
Small price differences can have a large budget impact for high-volume drugs. For 
example, roughly 294 million doses of simvastatin were consumed in France in 2013. For 
simvastatin alone, if France had paid the U.K. price per dose (€0.020 instead of €0.192), 
spending would have been more than €50 million less. There are caveats: volumes might not 
remain constant if prices change, and there might be differences in production and supply-
chain costs that prevent price equalization across countries. 
 
Recent evidence 
 
Recent studies indicate there are opportunities for cost savings in off-patent drug 
markets in Europe and the U.S. 
A high-profile inquiry by the European Commission into generic competition found 
that patients in EU countries have to wait an average of about seven months for generics to 
become available, starting from when brand-name drugs lost market exclusivity.31 The 
inquiry report, published in 2009, estimated that these delays cost payers in EU countries €3 
billion ($3.4) per year, based on retail prices.31 Those findings were echoed by a 2014 study, 
which found significant delays in the availability of generics in many European countries.32  
The Commission’s report showed that generics are slow to penetrate markets: after 
two years on the market, generics account for less than half of sales in EU member states.31 
The report also found that prices are slow to drop in many countries. Variation in prices and 
market shares between European countries has been attributed to differences in pricing and 
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reimbursement regulations, prescribing policies, and generic substitution laws, among other 
factors.28,31,33 
By comparison, the U.S. has historically had high rates of generic drug use — 84% of 
prescriptions were filled with generics in 2013 34 — and low prices.2 In recent years, 
however, it has seen a decrease in competition in the generics sector. Between 2012 and 
2013, the total cost of 280 widely used generic medicines only fell by 4% in the U.S., a 
slower rate of decline than in the previous seven years.35 This trend was due to a combination 
of issues, including supply-chain disruptions, tough market conditions driving firms out of 
business, a flurry of mergers and acquisitions, and backlogs in the processing of generic drug 
applications by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA).36-38  
In extreme cases, reduced competition has enabled individual companies to drastically 
raise the prices of generic drugs.39 For example, the price of pyrimethamine (Daraprim), an 
off-patent anti-infective medication, went up by about 5,500% overnight in 2015.40,41 Such 
price hikes have affected numerous generic drugs, including the widely used antibiotic 
doxycycline (Doryx) and the cholesterol-lowering drug pravastatin (Pravachol). The cost of 
500 doxycycline capsules rose from $20 in October 2013 to $1,928 in April 2014, while the 
cost of a one-year supply of pravastatin rose from $27 to $196 during the same period, 
according to an analysis by the senior citizen group AARP.42 The U.S. Government 
Accountability Office reported that between 2010 and 2015 there were “extraordinary prices 
increases” of 100% or more for 315 out of the 1,441 generics they studied.43 Many of the 
affected medicines have been around for decades at low cost.2,38,43  
Moreover, recent studies have shown that many American and European physicians, 
pharmacists, and patients do not perceive brand-name and generic drugs to be 
bioequivalent.44-54 A 2016 study found that 30% of surveyed physicians in the U.S. preferred 
prescribing brand-name drugs over their generic counterparts, while 27% believed generics 
Preprint of article accepted for publication in The Milbank Quarterly © 2017 The Milbank Memorial Fund. 
 
13 
 
cause more adverse effects than brand-name drugs.48 A 2013 U.S. study reported that two in 
five physicians “sometimes” or “often” prescribe brand-name drugs instead of equivalent 
generics when patients request the former.55  
In summary, there are shortcomings in generic drug markets in Europe and the U.S., 
notably delays in the availability of generics, high prices, and low utilization rates. These 
issues affect countries to varying degrees. In the next section, we outline contemporary 
generic drug policies in Europe and the U.S. to identify lessons which might be drawn from 
different approaches.  
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Generic drug policies in Europe and the U.S. 
 
There are vast differences between countries in terms of regulatory structures, 
lobbying powers of special-interest groups, patent-litigation systems, political economies of 
health-care systems, and perceptions of generics among patients and health-care 
professionals.56 Such differences influence the adoption and effectiveness of policies.  
Figure 3 shows the patchwork of policies in place in Europe. Generic drug 
substitution is mandatory in 13 countries, voluntary in 14, and forbidden in five. The situation 
with respect to generic prescribing is similarly diverse. Internal reference pricing, which 
limits how much insurers will reimburse for generics, is used in most countries.57-59 In several 
countries, health insurers buy generic drugs in bulk from the manufacturers that offer the best 
prices, a policy referred to as tendering.60,61 For example, a health insurer might put out a 
tender for one million packs of 20-mg simvastatin, and ask generic manufacturers to submit 
confidential bids. The winning manufacturer is asked to supply the entire market for the 
duration of the contract, which typically ranges from one to two years.61 
Figure 3 gives a broad overview of policies, but the way these policies are 
implemented varies considerably. Other supportive measures are often used to influence 
generic drug usage, such as charging higher co-payments on branded drugs that have generic 
equivalents to encourage patients to choose the latter. 
National governments in all but three EU member states (Denmark, Germany, and the 
U.K.) impose price controls on generics, i.e., maximum allowable prices.62 Often these 
controls are linked to the prices of brand-name drugs. In Spain, for instance, the first 
company to sell a generic version of a drug must price its product at least 40% below the 
price of the brand-name drug at the time of loss of market exclusivity; subsequent generic 
entrants must be priced at or below this level. Many EU governments also retain the right to 
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block large price increases for prescription drugs, including generics, if necessary to protect 
public health or reduce pressure on the public purse.21 As nearly all EU countries have 
universal health-care systems, funded either through government tax revenues or taxes on 
employers and employees, a population-based focus has strong political support from 
consumers and non-industry stakeholders in these states.63 
In the U.S., by comparison, generic prescribing is voluntary in all 50 states. Neither 
internal reference pricing nor tendering is used for generic drugs sold in non-hospital 
pharmacies. There are no government price controls on generics, and substitution laws differ 
from state to state, as shown in Figure 4.64 
Pricing, prescribing, and substitution policies can affect the prices and usage of 
generics.31 To illustrate this, Figure 5 shows how ex-manufacturer prices and market shares 
of ramipril (Altace), a drug widely used to treat high blood pressure, evolved between 1998 
and 2010 in four countries. Ramipril lost patent protection in each country in either 
November 2002 or March 2003, as indicated by the vertical lines.  
The figure shows that it took over a year for the first generic version of ramipril to 
come on the market in the U.K. and Spain, compared to two years in Sweden and three years 
in France. The trends in prices and market shares in each country varied considerably. In the 
U.K., the generic price fell to about a fifth of the branded price within three months of the 
first generic being launched. During this time, the price of the branded version remained 
unchanged and generic ramipril captured over 90% of the British market. In Spain, on the 
other hand, the generic competitor was introduced at about 60% of the branded price and only 
slowly gained market share, reaching around 10% after one year of being on the market, and 
only 25% after three years. The branded price then fell to match the generic, which showed 
no sign of responding to competition. In Sweden, at launch, the generic price was only 10% 
of the branded price, which rapidly fell to a similar level. The generic market share continued 
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to rise steeply, to almost 100%. In France, although the prices moved in step, the price of the 
generic drug remained about two-thirds that of the branded. Again, the generic gained a high 
market share within a few years of entering the market. By the end of 2009, generic ramipril 
cost seven times more in France (€0.236 per dose) than in Sweden (€0.033).
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Potential policy solutions 
 
Having summarized policies adopted in various countries, we now outline measures 
which appear to be effective in promoting price competition among generic drug companies 
and increasing the use of generic drugs, based on available evidence. These are generally 
applicable to both European countries and the U.S., wherever such policies are not yet in 
place, although decisions on which ones to implement in individual countries require detailed 
market analyses. 
 
Facilitate generic market entry 
 
First, national regulators should streamline the generic drug approval process. In 
response to recent price hikes in the U.S., Kesselheim et al. have called for regulators to 
prioritize applications from manufacturers trying to bring to market a generic medicine sold 
by three or fewer firms.2,36 This would put downward pressure on prices and make it harder 
for individual companies to have much influence over prices. For off-patent drugs facing 
limited or no competition, Kesselheim et al. further recommended that the FDA temporarily 
import generics from countries with equally high regulatory standards, like Canada and EU 
member states, to avoid paying high premiums.2  
Second, in countries with backlogs of applications for generic drug approval, 
governments could allocate more resources to national regulators to speed up the review 
process,2 or charge generic firms fees to increase resources available for the drug approval 
process, as is done by the U.S. FDA.65 In the EU, levels of backlogs vary greatly between 
national regulatory agencies, despite efforts to harmonize such processes across the union.31 
In the U.S., it currently takes about 15 months, on average, for generic drug makers to receive 
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an initial response from the FDA.66 Over 4,000 generic drugs were awaiting approval from 
the FDA as of mid-2016.67  
Third, regulators should address the anti-competitive tactics used by brand-name 
firms to delay generic drug launches. Brand-name manufacturers frequently file patent 
infringement lawsuits against generic drug makers for launching their drugs too early, 
preventing the marketing of generic products while the companies are tied up in court.31 
Some such lawsuits might reflect calculations by brand-name firms that the extra revenue 
obtained after patent expiry is likely to exceed the legal fees incurred.68 Brand-name firms 
have employed other strategies to hinder market entry for generic drugs, like filing patent 
clusters — complex webs of primary and secondary patents on pharmaceutical products and 
manufacturing processes that serve to extend periods of market exclusivity.31,69,70 Some 
medicines are protected by as many as 1,300 patents,31 making it difficult for generic drug 
makers to determine when they can legally enter the market. The U.S. Congress proposed 
new legislation in 2015 that could make it easier for generic drug companies to challenge 
patents without the need for lengthy and costly litigation.71 The bill is still under 
consideration. The European Commission has called for similar measures.31 
Fourth, regulators should block pay-for-delay deals, where brand-name drug makers 
offer generic manufacturers cash, or something else of value, to delay the introduction of 
generic drugs onto the market.31 Brand-name drug makers continue to enjoy monopolies, 
meaning consumers pay higher prices for longer. These deals happen in both Europe and the 
U.S. In 2009, the U.S. Federal Trade Commission (FTC) estimated that eliminating pay-for-
delay deals would save consumers and the federal government over $3.5 billion a year.72 A 
2013 Supreme Court ruling gave the FTC the authority to block such deals, which it has 
begun to do. Yet there continue to be legal disputes over what constitutes a pay-for-delay 
deal, which is hampering the FTC’s efforts. 
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Finally, regulators should facilitate access to samples of brand-name products for 
generic drug makers. Since 2007, some brand-name manufacturers have taken advantage of a 
legal loophole in the U.S. to block access to samples, citing restrictions imposed by the FDA 
through risk evaluation and mitigation strategies (REMS).73,74 This prevents generic drug 
companies from conducting bioequivalence tests prior to patent expiry. These test results are 
needed for companies to receive marketing authorization at the time of patent expiry. Several 
counter-measures have been proposed by Congress and the FDA, but none have been 
implemented to date.73 
 
Encourage price competition 
 
Studies on pricing policies indicate that allowing generic drug companies to set their 
own prices, while giving physicians and pharmacists incentives to prescribe and dispense the 
least expensive generics, is more effective at driving down prices over time than government-
mandated price controls.27,31,75-78 This is the approach adopted by Denmark, Sweden, the 
U.K., and the U.S.,33 although the Swedish authorities reserve the right to block large price 
increases for generics. An analysis of IMS Health data conducted by the FDA found that drug 
prices in the U.S. drop, on average, by around 50% with two generic competitors on the 
market, around 70% with five on the market, and around 90% with 15 or more on the 
market.79 
Tendering is another way to encourage price competition. As mentioned earlier, 
tendering refers to the bulk purchase of generic drugs from the manufacturers that offer the 
lowest prices. It has been shown to lower administrative costs, drive down the prices of 
generics, and improve price transparency.60,61,80,81 In the Netherlands, for example, the 
introduction of tendering resulted in the retail prices of some generics, including amlodipine, 
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omeprazole, and simvastatin (Table 2), dropping by 80% to 90% overnight in non-hospital 
pharmacies.80 The color, shape, and size of a pill might change after a tender if a new 
manufacturer is asked to supply the market, so physicians and pharmacists need to 
communicate such changes to patients to promote treatment adherence.82-84 Also, European 
payers in charge of tendering increasingly split contracts between two or more manufacturers, 
as long as the bids are close to each other, to minimize the risk of supply disruptions and to 
maintain competition.61 There is no conclusive evidence, though, that disruptions occur more 
often in countries which rely on tendering than in others. 
 
Promote generic dispensing and prescribing 
 
Countries should require pharmacists to substitute generic drugs for brand-name 
medicines. The Swedish national government, for example, introduced mandatory generic 
substitution in 2002, which led to a spike in generic drug use.85 The European Commission 
has found that generic drugs enter the market sooner, on average, in EU member states with 
mandatory substitution.31 Currently, generic substitution is mandatory in only 11 EU 
countries and 14 U.S. states.21,64 
Governments should encourage or require physicians to prescribe drugs by their 
generic names.33,86 A recent study estimated that physicians blocking generic drug 
substitution costs the U.S. over $7.5 billion per year, including $1.2 billion in out-of-pocket 
fees for patients.87 This practice has also been shown to be costly in European countries, 
including France88 and Switzerland.89 There may be legitimate reasons for prescribing brand-
name drugs instead of generic ones — for example, a patient might be allergic to an inactive 
ingredient in a generic medicine.82 In many cases, however, those decisions are likely due to 
habit or misconceptions about generic medicines among physicians.64 Academic detailing, 
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which refers to the practice of having trained experts with no conflicts of interest provide 
unbiased information to clinicians about the effectiveness, safety, and costs of drugs, could 
help correct suboptimal prescribing.90 A meta-analysis conducted for the Cochrane 
Collaboration found, based on data from 25 randomized controlled trials, that academic 
detailing improves compliance with desired prescribing practices.90 Financial incentives 
aimed at improving rates of generic prescribing have also been shown to be effective, 
although the evidence base is limited.91,92  
Moreover, regulators in some countries allow pharmacists to substitute a generic for a 
brand-name drug with a different active ingredient, as long as both drugs belong to the same 
therapeutic class and have the same indication. For example, if a doctor prescribes a patient 
rosuvastatin, a cholesterol-lowering drug not yet available in generic form in some countries, 
a pharmacist could give the patient generic simvastatin instead.93 A recent study estimated 
that the U.S. spends an extra $73.0 billion per year — about 10% of total drug spending — 
on brand-name drugs with available therapeutic substitutes. This estimate included $24.6 
billion in out-of-pocket expenses.94 Most of the estimated excess spending was on brand-
name drugs in five classes: statins, a class of cholesterol-reducing drugs ($10.9 billion); 
atypical antipsychotics, a class of drugs used to treat psychiatric conditions ($9.99 billion); 
proton pump inhibitors, a class of drugs used to treat heartburn and related conditions ($6.12 
billion); selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors, a class of drugs used to treat depression 
($6.08 billion); and angiotensin receptor blockers, a class of drugs used to lower blood 
pressure ($5.53 billion).94 
Therapeutic substitutes can vary in terms of side effects and other properties, so this 
form of substitution is less straightforward to implement than substitution of bioequivalent 
products. For therapeutic substitution to be more widely practiced, the relevant authorities 
and clinical organizations should develop appropriate protocols and strengthen coordination 
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between physicians, pharmacists, and insurers.94-96 A challenge is to get buy-in from trade 
groups for physicians, many of which have, in the past, opposed such restrictions on 
prescribing and have raised concerns about the potential adverse health consequences for 
patients.94,97 In the U.S., some patient organizations have also been skeptical of therapeutic 
substitution, worried that legislators are too focused on cutting costs at the expense of quality 
of care.96   
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Barriers to reforming generic drug policies: A case study from the U.S. 
 
Having reviewed a range of policy options, we now draw on the experience of one 
country, the U.S., to explore barriers to reform and offer thoughts on how they might be 
overcome. While we focus on the history of substitution and bioequivalence policies in the 
U.S. as a case study, similar analyses could be done for any country.  
The history of generic drug substitution in the U.S. (Box 1) shows how trade groups 
for brand-name drug makers and clinicians have consistently banded together to resist generic 
drug policy reform in the U.S.98-100 It is a history marked by political conflicts, vested 
economic interests, and intense lobbying by stakeholders.96 Figure 6 highlights key events 
and milestones. 
Regulation of bioequivalence has played a key role in the evolution of substitution 
policies in the U.S.19,96,101 In the 1950s and ‘60s, when U.S. lawmakers started calling for 
generic prescribing and substitution, there was little clarity about how to verify that generic 
drugs would produce the same therapeutic effects as their brand-name counterparts. A 
scandal erupted in 1967 when it was found that some patients who consumed generic 
versions of chloramphenicol (Chloromycetin), a widely used antibiotic, had no traces of the 
active ingredient in their bloodstreams. It was later shown that the coating used by some 
generic manufacturers prevented the drug from dissolving in the gastrointestinal tract.101 
In response, between 1967 and 1975, the U.S. FDA commissioned five separate 
external committees to provide input on how to assess the therapeutic equivalence of generic 
and brand-name drugs.96 The proliferation of committees and recommendations slowed down 
the market entry of generic drugs, hurt the public perception of generics, hampered the 
campaign to roll back anti-substitution laws, and delayed other changes to generic drug 
policies during this period.96,98,102 The scientific and regulatory uncertainty around 
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bioequivalence created space for brand-name manufacturers and their trade groups to nurture 
brand loyalty and to claim, often without evidence, that there were meaningful differences 
between branded and generic medicines.96,102 Not until 1984 did the FDA settle on a coherent 
and widely-accepted set of bioequivalence standards — based on the rate and extent of 
absorption of the active ingredient into the bloodstream17 — as part of the Drug Price 
Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act, more commonly known as the Hatch-Waxman 
Act.101 
The issues raised by the proponents and critics of generic drug policy reform have 
remained similar over the last 50 years in the U.S.98,103 The evolution of substitution and 
bioequivalence regulation provides insights into the economic, political, cultural, and 
scientific issues influencing policy changes. Such insights can help policymakers avoid past 
pitfalls. 
 
 
Box 1. History of drug substitution in the U.S. 
 
 
Generic drug substitution 
 
The first instances of generic drug substitution were reported in the late 1940s. In response, the National 
Pharmaceutical Council (NPC), a trade organization for the brand-name drug industry, began aggressively 
lobbying against substitution, saying it would stifle innovation. The group further claimed that substitution 
would reduce quality of care, citing the scientific uncertainty that existed at the time over whether generic 
drugs were as effective as brand-name drugs.101 
 
The NPC (and, later, the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association [PMA]) forged an alliance with the 
American Medical Association (AMA) and the American Pharmacists Association (APhA), two major trade 
groups for clinicians and pharmacists. The AMA argued that substitution diminished the role of physicians, 
while the APhA said it was a violation of the ethical and professional standards of the trade. (In an apparent 
quid pro quo, the NPC helped pharmacists lobby against supermarkets, which were beginning to sell 
prescription and over-the-counter drugs.) The AMA was further concerned that government intervention on 
dispensing was a step towards socialized medicine, which they opposed. 
 
The anti-substitution campaign was largely successful: by 1959, 44 states had enacted laws blocking generic 
drug substitution.  
 
During the 1960s and ‘70s, when state health-care budgets were ballooning, state and municipal governments 
started looking at ways to cut health-care spending. Meanwhile, there was growing support for substitution 
among pharmacists, who sought a more active role in the care of patients. In 1972, Kentucky became the first 
state to abolish its anti-substitution law. By 1984, all 50 states had legalized generic drug substitution. 
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However, state policies differed in three ways. First, generic substitution was compulsory in some states and 
voluntary in others. Second, patients in many states could refuse substitution. Finally, some states restricted 
which drugs pharmacists could substitute.  
 
The rollback of anti-substitution laws on a state level resulted in a patchwork of policies, most of which 
remain in place today. Physicians in all states can block substitution, usually by ticking a box on the 
prescription pad which reads “dispense as written.”64 The poorer states have some of the weakest substitution 
laws in the country, leading one commentator to recently note that “the cost savings of generic substitution 
[in the U.S.] now appear to benefit populations in inverse proportion to economic need.”96  
 
To date, all attempts by federal legislators to enforce a minimum standard of substitution have been voted 
down, and the politics and economics of substitution have continued to play out at the state level.104 Still, 
substitution laws have helped dramatically increase the rate of generic drug use in the U.S.: around 10% of 
prescriptions were filled generically in 1958, compared to 88% in 2015. 
 
 
Therapeutic drug substitution 
 
In the 1980s, state lawmakers and hospital administrators turned their attention to therapeutic substitution. 
Proponents argued that many new drugs offered little or no additional therapeutic benefit over existing ones 
and that they should be substituted for older, cheaper medicines — preferably generics. This would generate 
savings and incentivize drug companies to develop innovative products. Trade groups for brand-name drug 
makers and clinicians opposed therapeutic substitution, claiming it would harm patients.  
 
Oregon passed the first therapeutic substitution law in 1981, and hospitals around the country began 
implementing a two-tiered approach: automatic therapeutic substitution in clear-cut cases (e.g., 
cephalosporins, anti-allergy drugs, and heartburn treatments), and prior authorization in less straightforward 
cases (e.g., beta blockers and anti-cancer drugs). Between 1987 and 1993, the proportion of health 
maintenance organizations which allowed therapeutic substitution in non-hospital pharmacies doubled to 
70%. 
 
Private and public insurers increasingly turned to pharmacy benefit managers (PBMs), which serve as 
intermediaries between drug companies and payers, to help coordinate therapeutic substitution. PBMs 
negotiate lower drug prices and rebates on behalf of large patient populations. Most PBMs operate 
formularies specifying the preferred products for different therapeutic indications. These organizations help 
dictate the nature and extent of generic and therapeutic substitution. They often rely on tiered co-payment 
systems, whereby patients are required to pay more for brand-name drugs. 
 
The lack of transparency with PBMs, however, meant that insurers were unsure about how much of the 
negotiated discounts was passed on to them, and how much was kept by PBMs. Some PBMs were bought up 
by pharmaceutical companies, introducing further conflicts of interest. 
 
In 2000, partly in response to the rapid growth and opaqueness of PBMs, the Oregon state legislature 
implemented guidelines on which medicines should be prescribed to Medicaid patients for specific 
conditions, known as a preferred drug list.105,106 The preferred drug list was the “public, transparent, 
evidence-based analogue of the private formulary-shaping activities of the PBMs.”96 Idaho and Washington 
quickly followed suit and developed their own lists.  
 
These three states joined forces with the Pacific Northwest Evidence-based Practice Center in 2003 to form 
the Drug Effectiveness Review Project (DERP): a collaboration between Medicaid and public pharmacy 
programs in member states to promote evidence-based prescribing. By 2008, the DERP consortium 
comprised 15 states and two non-profit organizations, and 33 states operated preferred drug lists, most of 
which promoted therapeutic substitution wherever possible. 
 
The recent economic downturn has put the project under financial strain. In 2014, there were only nine 
paying members in the consortium. Still, DERP has paved the way for future research into comparative 
effectiveness, a field fraught with ethical, political, methodological, organizational, and procedural issues. 
 
Source: Authors based on 96,98,107; other references are shown in the text.  
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Current opportunities for reform 
 
Recent developments point to an opportunity for reform of generic drug policies in 
the U.S.  
In the past few years, a series of price scandals has shifted public attention from the 
high prices of new medicines to the rising costs of generics, raising pressure on companies 
and policymakers to contain costs.108 A 2015 national survey by the Kaiser Family 
Foundation found that roughly three in four Americans believe prescription drug prices are 
unreasonably high, and, of those, 76% say pharmaceutical companies are mostly to blame.109 
These findings may partly reflect the reputational damage to generic drug makers caused by 
recent scandals, as well as the increase in the number of patients facing higher deductibles for 
medicines.110  
A subsequent Kaiser poll, in 2016, found that the vast majority of Americans are in 
favor of government action to curb prescription drug prices.111 According to the results, more 
than eight in 10 Americans (82%) favor allowing Medicare to negotiate prices with 
companies, while 66% support the creation of an independent group to oversee the pricing of 
prescription drugs and 71% believe patients should be allowed to buy medicines imported 
from Canada.111 
The increasing roles of federal and state governments in health care has further 
renewed attention on cost containment.96,107,112 A growing number of government officials, 
including Senators Bernie Sanders (D-VT), Susan Collins (R-ME), Elijah Cummings (D-
MD), and Claire McCaskill (D-MO) are looking at ways to improve competition in the off-
patent drug market to reduce spending, with some arguing that state and federal governments 
should be allowed to block unjustified price increases on generics.113,114 Competition 
authorities are also investigating potential price collusion between generic companies.115,116 
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Private health insurers, which have a strong interest in keeping generic prices low, have 
joined the debate, arguing on the side of lawmakers on this issue. They were largely absent 
from discussions in the 1970s, ‘80s, and ‘90s, when the prices of drugs were rising more 
slowly than those of other health-care goods and services.96  
The outcome of the 2016 presidential election could provide further momentum for 
improving generic drug policies. During the campaign, President Donald Trump supported 
giving Medicare greater power to negotiate drug prices and allowing states to import less 
expensive drugs from Canada and elsewhere. He launched an attack on the pharmaceutical 
industry at a press conference a few days prior to his inauguration. “Pharma has a lot of 
lobbies, a lot of lobbyists, and a lot of power,” Trump said at the press conference. “And 
there’s very little bidding on drugs. We’re the largest buyer of drugs in the world, and yet we 
don’t bid properly. And we’re going to start bidding and we’re going to save billions of 
dollars.” Since taking office, Trump has reiterated his support for Medicare drug price 
negotiations. He has also stated his desire to streamline the FDA drug approval process, but 
without offering specifics on how he would like to see the process for generic drugs changed. 
Scott Gottlieb, Trump’s nominee for FDA commissioner who has close links to the 
pharmaceutical industry and a conservative think tank, has also criticized the costs and delays 
of generic drug approvals. There are concerns, however, that changes to FDA procedures 
may harm the organization’s ability to guarantee the efficacy, quality, and safety of approved 
drugs, including generics.117 While it remains to be seen how these developments play out in 
practice, the available evidence indicates a willingness by the Trump administration to 
address price hikes and to ensure the availability of low-cost generics. It is critical, though, 
that any changes to FDA procedures do not undermine the agency’s ability to ensure that 
approved generics meet adequate regulatory standards. 
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Yet, at this writing, American health policy is extremely uncertain,118-122 and there are 
reasons why changes to generic drug policies may prove elusive.  
In January 2017, the Republican-controlled Congress approved a budget resolution 
that sets the stage for a major overhaul of the health-care system, an action supported by 
Trump’s health secretary.121 Republican lawmakers have since given more details about the 
health-care plan they intend to introduce in place of the Affordable Care Act. Among other 
things, the proposed bill would eliminate the requirement that all people in the U.S. have 
health insurance, remove a mandate for larger companies to offer affordable insurance to 
employees, increase annual limits on how much individuals and families can contribute to 
health savings accounts, repeal certain subsidies for out-pocket costs, remove caps on how 
much health insurers can charge older customers in monthly premiums, and cut federal 
funding for Medicaid, a publicly funded insurance program for low-income individuals and 
families.123  
A recent analysis conducted by the U.S. Congressional Budget Office (CBO) 
estimated that these measures would drastically increase the number of uninsured over the 
next 10 years and lead to hikes in health-care premiums in the coming three years.124 It is 
unclear what impact such changes would have on the U.S. generic drug market, with the 
CBO report silent on this issue. 
Moreover, the American Medical Association (AMA) and the Pharmaceutical 
Research and Manufacturers of America (PhRMA) are among the largest and most influential 
lobbying organizations in the U.S., and both continue to oppose government intervention in 
the pharmaceutical market.98 Although the two groups supported the Affordable Care Act, 
they did so only after having received assurances that there would be no price controls on 
medicines and no importation of cheaper medicines from other countries, among other 
conditions.98  
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Discussion 
 
 A mix of factors, including aging populations, slowing economic growth, and rising 
costs of new drugs and medical technologies, have put pressure on governments to contain 
health-care spending. Substituting generic medicines for more expensive brand-name versions 
is likely among the most cost-effective interventions in health-care systems.125-131 
Addressing issues in the generic drug sector can enhance equitable access to medicines 
in countries where patients face high out-of-pocket drug costs, like Cyprus,132 Greece,133 and 
the U.S.134 Several studies indicate that patients who use generic medicines instead of brand-
name ones are more likely to adhere to treatment,135,136 probably because of greater 
affordability, which can improve health outcomes.135 
Between 2008 and 2015, in the wake of the global economic recession, several 
European governments implemented generic drug policies to help control costs.21,137-139 
During this period, Slovakia introduced voluntary generic prescribing, which was previously 
forbidden. Belgium, Estonia, Greece, Portugal, and Spain made generic prescribing 
compulsory. Greece and Portugal made generic substitution compulsory. And Finland 
introduced internal reference pricing.  
Yet, as our results show, there remain large differences in the usage and prices of 
generics in Europe and the U.S. The barriers to market entry for generic companies vary 
between countries, as do pricing and reimbursement policies. Beyond such features of the 
market, there are differences in whether, and to what extent, patients and health-care 
professionals perceive generic and branded medicines to be bioequivalent.44,45,52 In some 
countries, negative perceptions of generics may have contributed to slower uptake of stronger 
prescribing and substitution measures. 
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Governments should apply coherent supply- and demand-side policies in generic drug 
markets.140 There are interesting examples from smaller European countries, like Denmark,141 
Norway,142 and Sweden,141 which have achieved low generic drug prices. There is no one-
size-fits-all solution, though, and there are different ways of achieving similar results. For 
instance, the U.K. is one of the few EU countries to forbid generic substitution. The 
electronic prescribing system in the U.K., however, automatically prompts physicians to 
prescribe generic drugs when available. The country has one of the highest rates of generic 
drug use in the world,143 although some analysts argue that substitution should still be made 
mandatory in the U.K. since physicians can be influenced by the marketing of drug 
companies.144  
The appropriate steps to reduce generic drug prices and to boost demand for such 
medicines will vary between countries. For example, in nations with historically high rates of 
generic drug use and low generic drug prices, but which are experiencing generic drug 
shortages, like the U.S., the emphasis should be on facilitating market entry for generic drug 
companies. In countries with low rates of generic drug use, like Greece and Italy, more 
should be done to improve the perceptions of generics among physicians, pharmacists, and 
patients.  
Finally, it is important to trace the cultural, political, regulatory, and scientific issues 
influencing the adoption of generic drug policies. Historical analyses can help policymakers 
avoid past stumbling blocks when trying to enact reform.145 For example, in a comparative 
study of drug regulation in the U.S. and Germany, Arthur A. Daemmrich analyzed the 
evolution of the medical and political settings of each country during the 20th century, 
highlighting points of convergence and divergence.56 Daemmrich noted that legislative 
changes to prescription-drug laws in the U.S. often occur in response to public scandals. In 
Germany, by contrast, changes tend to follow protracted negotiations between lawmakers and 
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stakeholders.56 Drug regulation is highly politicized and adversarial in the U.S., but much less 
so in Germany, where health care is widely seen as a right.56 Such political and cultural 
factors help to explain differences in generic drug policies between countries. Moreover, 
pharmaceutical policies involve balancing the interests of the health-care system with those 
of the pharmaceutical industry, with this balance varying between countries. 
 
Limitations 
 
The price comparisons in this study have limitations. 
First, an assumption behind the Laspeyres index is that demand for prescription 
generic drugs is price inelastic — i.e., change in the price of a generic does not affect 
demand. Although empirical data suggest that this is unlikely to be true,146,147 other types of 
weighted indexes make assumptions which might be less likely to hold.25-27 Laspeyres 
indexes are therefore commonly used to compare drug prices.24-26,141,148 
Second, the IMS Health data do not reflect confidential rebates and discounts. The list 
prices, i.e., official prices before discounts, may overestimate the actual prices paid for some 
products.149 Even so, list prices are meaningful to payers since they are the starting point for 
discount negotiations. It is important to strengthen price transparency in generic drug 
markets, as opaque pricing makes it easier for drug makers to charge the highest prices 
markets will bear.  
Third, to aggregate price data across drug forms and strengths, it is necessary to use a 
common unit of volume. As Danzon and Kim have explained, "the ideal unit would be a 
quality-constant … course of therapy for a given drug, which should be applicable to all 
[forms] and strengths. Such ideal units are not observable."25 In calculating prices per dose, 
we implicitly assume that a single dose of a drug is of equal therapeutic value to all patients, 
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regardless of form or strength. Some studies have instead calculated prices per gram of active 
ingredient, but this measure suffers from other limitations.25 
Finally, we had to exclude 4.1% of the drugs in our sample due to missing 
information on dosage. These were mostly aerosol, cream, gel, injectable, and powder 
products. This might have influenced our findings if there were systematic differences across 
countries in the prices of those types of products. Still, the common sample accounted for a 
large share of total generic sales in every country but the U.K. (25%). The U.K. results 
should be interpreted with caution.  
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Conclusions 
 
Greater use of generic medicines is one way to constrain growth in health-care 
spending, at a time when this is a political imperative everywhere. Yet across high-income 
countries, generic prices and market shares vary widely. This is despite the existence of 
effective policies to reduce delays in generic availability, stimulate price competition, and 
increase generic drug use. There are, however, signs of change. European payers and 
policymakers are showing growing interest in tendering to lower prices, something that 
seems to be effective.  
An immediate priority is to persuade more physicians, pharmacists, and patients that 
generic drugs are bioequivalent to branded products, although this may take time. In the 
meanwhile, much could be achieved by requiring generic prescribing and substitution where 
such policies are not yet in place. 
Given the mixed progress so far, it is critical to understand why previous initiatives 
failed. Much can be learnt from policy analyses, such as the one in this paper. These typically 
highlight the role played by special-interest groups in obstructing reform. 
Finally, it is important to be realistic about what can be achieved. Despite some 
widely publicized examples of profiteering, discussed earlier, most of the growth in drug 
spending will continue to be driven by new medicines. For some treatments, like certain 
cancer immunotherapies, the complex manufacturing process means that the scope for off-
patent products is still limited. Yet, there are opportunities for significant cost savings from 
generics in many countries and, even where there are historically strong generic markets, like 
the U.S., regulators, policymakers, and payers can do more to ensure timely generic drug 
availability.  
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics on generic drug markets (2013) 
 
Population 
(millions) 
Generic spending 
(billions) 
Generic spending 
(per capita) 
Generic volume 
(billions of doses)  
Generic volume 
(per capita) 
Proportion of generic 
spend accounted for 
by the sample 
Generic market 
share (volume) 
Generic market 
share (value) 
Belgium 11.2 € 0.45 € 40.6 4.2 251.6 56% 32% 14% 
Denmark 5.6 € 0.17 € 29.6 2.7 481.6 56% 54% 14% 
France 66.0 € 4.14 € 62.8 25.6 387.9 52% 30% 16% 
Germany 82.1 € 5.20 € 63.4 37.6 458.3 51% 80% 37% 
Greece 11.0 € 0.45 € 41.0 2.3 207.4 67% 20% 15% 
Italy 60.2 € 2.08 € 34.5 15.3 254.0 47% 19% 11% 
Netherlands 16.8 € 0.50 € 29.8 7.5 445.7 47% 70% 16% 
Poland 38.0 € 1.55 € 40.9 16.2 425.5 46% 57% 42% 
Portugal 10.5 € 0.47 € 45.1 2.8 401.1 49% 39% 23% 
Spain 46.6 € 2.12 € 45.6 19.4 416.0 54% 47% 21% 
Sweden 9.6 € 0.32 € 33.8 3.8 399.2 72% 44% 15% 
Switzerland 8.1 € 0.51 € 63.4 1.8 231.7 71% 17% 16% 
U.K. 64.1 € 2.87 € 44.8 36.3 566.0 25% 83% 33% 
Note: All monetary figures are based on ex-manufacturer prices. The market shares account for reimbursed generics in hospital and retail pharmacies.150  
Source: The population figures were reported by the World Bank.151 The market shares were reported by the OECD,34 with the exception of the Polish and Swedish figures (IMS Health, 
2013). The rest of the data were reported by IMS Health (2013, Pricing Insights database).
Preprint of article accepted for publication in The Milbank Quarterly © 2017 The Milbank Memorial Fund. 
 
50 
 
Table 2. Ex-manufacturer prices (€ per dose) of seven top-selling active ingredients (2013) 
  Amlodipine Atorvastatin Esomeprazole Metformin Omeprazole Pantoprazole Simvastatin 
Belgium € 0.11 € 0.20 € 0.19 € 0.03 € 0.24 € 0.20 € 0.12 
Denmark € 0.01 € 0.12 € 0.27 € 0.01 € 0.04 € 0.03 € 0.02 
France € 0.14 € 0.27 € 0.19 € 0.06 € 0.20 € 0.19 € 0.19 
Germany € 0.01 € 0.07 € 0.16 € 0.02 € 0.12 € 0.17 € 0.08 
Greece € 0.17 € 0.52 € 0.27 € 0.04 € 0.45 € 0.40 € 0.40 
Italy € 0.09 € 0.13 € 0.26 € 0.03 € 0.21 € 0.22 € 0.11 
Netherlands € 0.02 € 0.09 € 0.11 € 0.02 € 0.03 € 0.04 € 0.02 
Poland € 0.06 € 0.12 € 0.15 € 0.04 € 0.17 € 0.09 € 0.10 
Portugal € 0.07 € 0.12 € 0.17 € 0.04 € 0.09 € 0.09 € 0.08 
Spain € 0.04 € 0.29 € 0.43 € 0.02 € 0.06 € 0.32 € 0.04 
Sweden € 0.02 € 0.10 € 0.18 € 0.03 € 0.11 € 0.15 € 0.05 
Switzerland € 0.32 € 0.40 € 0.47 € 0.05 € 0.81 € 0.30 € 0.48 
United Kingdom € 0.01 € 0.03 € 0.14 € 0.02 € 0.03 € 0.03 € 0.02 
% difference 2723% 1990% 450% 469% 3027% 1492% 2382% 
Source: Authors’ analysis of data from the Pricing Insights database (IMS Health, 2013). 
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Figure 1. Ex-manufacturer prices of generics (2013) 
 
Source: Authors’ analysis of data from the Pricing Insights database (IMS Health, 2013). 
 
Figure 2. Retail prices of generics (2013)
 
Note: Retail prices were unavailable for the Netherlands and the U.K. 
Source: Authors’ analysis of data from the Pricing Insights database (IMS Health, 2013).
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Figure 3. Internal reference pricing (A), generic prescribing (B), generic substitution (C), and 
tendering (D) in EU and EFTA countries (2016) 
 
 
EFTA, European Free Trade Association; EU, European Union; IRP, internal reference pricing 
Note: These maps show the policies used by the 28 EU member states and the four EFTA signatories (Iceland, 
Lichtenstein, Norway, and Switzerland) for non-hospital pharmacies. We populated the maps based on a 2016 report 
published by the World Health Organization.21 If information was missing, we used older sources dating as far back 
as 2009. The policies in some countries may have changed since then. In Spain, only the autonomous community of 
Andalusia issues tenders. Generic prescribing refers to the prescribing of drugs by their international non-proprietary 
names. The Danish and Swedish tendering systems operate differently to the others. In each country, the relevant 
national government agency asks generic manufacturers to offer their best prices. Usually, the least expensive 
generics become the only ones which pharmacists can dispense; if a patient wants a brand-name drug, they are 
required to pay the difference out-of-pocket. The bidding process is repeated every two weeks in Denmark, and every 
four weeks in Sweden. There are safeguards to reduce the risk of supply disruptions. 
Source: Authors based on 21,60-62,152-154; the map toolkit is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-
NoDerivs 3.0 Unported License. 
A B 
C D 
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Figure 4. Generic drug substitution laws in the U.S. (2010) 
 
Note: States with “patient choice” grant patients the right to refuse generic drug substitution, usually at a higher cost. 
Source: Authors based on 64; the map toolkit is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 3.0 Unported License. 
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Figure 5. Ex-manufacturer prices (€ per dose) and market shares (%) of brand-name and generic ramipril in four countries (1998-2010) 
 
Note: The vertical lines show the date of patent expiry (November 2002 in France, Sweden, and the U.K.; March 2003 in Spain). The Swedish and British prices were 
converted to € using official exchange rates. The data correspond to sales in non-hospital pharmacies (except for Sweden, where the data include sales in hospital and non-
hospital pharmacies). Data on sales of branded ramipril in France between January 1998 and December 1999 were unavailable. Prices and market shares were measured on a 
quarterly basis. Source: Authors’ analysis of data from the Midas database (IMS Health, 2010).
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Figure 6. Key events and milestones for U.S. drug substitution 
 
APhA, American Pharmacists Association; HMO, health maintenance organization 
Source: Authors based on 96,107.
Preprint of article accepted for publication in The Milbank Quarterly © 2017 The Milbank Memorial Fund. 
 
56 
 
Appendix 1. List of the 200 most-prescribed off-patent active ingredients in Europe in 2013 
(anatomical main group in parentheses) 
 
1. Acetylcysteine (R/S/V) 2. Acetylsalicylic acid (A/B/N) 
3. Aciclovir (D/J/S) 4. Alendronic acid (M) 
5. Alfuzosin (G) 6. Allopurinol (M) 
7. Alprazolam (N) 8. Alprostadil (C/G) 
9. Amiodarone (C) 10. Amisulpride (N) 
11. Amitriptyline (N) 12. Amlodipine (C)  
13. Amlodipine / perindopril (C) 14. Amoxicillin (J)  
15. Amoxicillin / clavulanic acid (J) 16. Anastrozole (L) 
17. Apomorphine (G/N) 18. Atenolol (C) 
19. Atorvastatin (C) 20. Azathioprine (L) 
21. Azithromycin (J/S) 22. Beclometasone (A/D/R) 
23. Betahistine (N) 24. Betamethasone (A/C/D/H/R/S) 
25. Bicalutamide (L) 26. Bisoprolol (C) 
27. Bisoprolol / hydrochlorothiazide (C) 28. Bromazepam (N) 
29. Budesonide (A/D/R) 30. Buprenorphine (N) 
31. Candesartan cilexetil (C) 32. Candesartan cilexetil / hydrochlorothiazide (C) 
33. Carbamazepine (N) 34. Carbidopa / levodopa (N) 
35. Carvedilol (C) 36. Cefpodoxime proxetil (J) 
37. Ceftriaxone (J) 38. Cefuroxime axetil (J/S) 
39. Cetirizine (R) 40. Ciclosporin (L/S) 
41. Ciprofloxacin (J/S) 42. Citalopram (N) 
43. Clarithromycin (J) 44. Clindamycin (D/G/J) 
45. Clopidogrel (B) 46. Clozapine (N) 
47. Codeine (N/R) 48. Codeine / paracetamol (N) 
49. Cyproterone ethinylestradiol (G) 50. Desloratadine (R) 
51. Desmopressin (H) 52. Desogestrel / ethinylestradiol (G) 
53. Dexamethasone (A/C/D/H/R/S) 54. Diazepam (N) 
55. Diclofenac (D/M/S) 56. Dienogest / ethinylestradiol (G) 
57. Diltiazem (C) 58. Docetaxel (L) 
59. Domperidone (A) 60. Donepezil (N) 
61. Doxazosin (C) 62. Doxycycline (A/J) 
63. Drospirenone / ethinylestradiol (G) 64. Ebastine (R) 
65. Enalapril (C) 66. Enalapril / hydrochlorothiazide (C) 
67. Erythromycin (D/J/S) 68. Escitalopram (N) 
69. Esomeprazole (A) 70. Estradiol (G) 
71. Estradiol / norethisterone (G) 72. Ethinylestradiol / gestodene (G) 
73. Ethinylestradiol / levonorgestrel (G) 74. Felodipine (C) 
75. Fenofibrate (C) 76. Fentanyl (N) 
77. Finasteride (D/G) 78. Flucloxacillin (J) 
Preprint of article accepted for publication in The Milbank Quarterly © 2017 The Milbank Memorial Fund. 
 
57 
 
79. Fluconazole (D/J) 80. Fluoxetine (N) 
81. Fluticasone / salmeterol (R) 82. Fluvastatin (C) 
83. Formoterol (R) 84. Furosemide (C) 
85. Gabapentin (N) 86. Galantamine (N) 
87. Gliclazide (A) 88. Glimepiride (A) 
89. Hyaluronic acid (D/M/R/S) 90. Hydrochlorothiazide (C) 
91. Hydrochlorothiazide / lisinopril (C) 92. Hydrochlorothiazide / losartan (C) 
93. Hydrochlorothiazide / ramipril (C) 94. Hydrochlorothiazide / valsartan (C) 
95. Hydrocortisone (A/C/D/H/S) 96. Hydromorphone (N) 
97. Ibandronic acid (M) 98. Ibuprofen (C/G/M) 
99. Indapamide (C) 100. Indapamide / perindopril (C) 
101. Iodine / levothyroxine sodium (H) 102. Ipratropium bromide (R) 
103. Irbesartan (C) 104. Irinotecan (L) 
105. Isosorbide mononitrate (C) 106. Isotretinoin (D) 
107. Ketoprofen (M) 108. Lamotrigine (N) 
109. Lansoprazole (A) 110. Latanoprost (S) 
111. Leflunomide (L) 112. Lercanidipine (C) 
113. Letrozole (L) 114. Leuprorelin (L) 
115. Levetiracetam (N) 116. Levocetirizine (R) 
117. Levofloxacin (J/S) 118. Levothyroxine sodium (H) 
119. Lidocaine (C/D/N/R/S) 120. Lisinopril (C) 
121. Lorazepam (N) 122. Lormetazepam (N) 
123. Losartan (C) 124. Memantine (N) 
125. Mesalazine (A) 126. Metamizole sodium (N) 
127. Metformin (A) 128. Methadone (N) 
129. Methotrexate (L) 130. Methylphenidate (N) 
131. Metoprolol (C) 132. Metronidazole (A/D/G/J/P) 
133. Mirtazapine (N) 134. Molsidomine (C) 
135. Montelukast (R) 136. Morphine (N) 
137. Moxonidine (C) 138. Naloxone / tilidine (N/V) 
139. Naproxen (G/M) 140. Nebivolol (C) 
141. Nifedipine (C) 142. Nitroglycerin (C) 
143. Ofloxacin (J/S) 144. Olanzapine (N) 
145. Omeprazole (A) 146. Ondansetron (A) 
147. Oxaliplatin (L) 148. Oxycodone (N) 
149. Paclitaxel (L) 150. Pantoprazole (A) 
151. Paracetamol (N) 152. Paracetamol / tramadol (N) 
153. Paroxetine (N) 154. Penicillin (J/S) 
155. Perindopril (C) 156. Phenytoin (N) 
157. Piracetam (N) 158. Pramipexole (N) 
159. Pravastatin (C) 160. Prednisolone (A/C/D/H/R/S) 
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161. Prednisone (A/H) 162. Progesterone (G) 
163. Propranolol (C) 164. Quetiapine (N) 
165. Rabeprazole (A) 166. Ramipril (C) 
167. Ranitidine (A) 168. Repaglinide (A) 
169. Rilmenidine (C) 170. Risedronic acid (M) 
171. Risperidone (N) 172. Ropinirole (N) 
173. Rosuvastatin (C) 174. Salbutamol (R) 
175. Sertraline (N) 176. Sildenafil (G) 
177. Simvastatin (C) 178. Spironolactone (C) 
179. Sumatriptan (N) 180. Tamsulosin (G) 
181. Temazepam (N) 182. Temozolomide (L) 
183. Terbinafine (D) 184. Testosterone (G) 
185. Timolol (C/S) 186. Tolterodine (G) 
187. Topiramate (N) 188. Torasemide (C) 
189. Tramadol (N) 190. Trazodone (N) 
191. Trimebutine (A) 192. Trimetazidine (C) 
193. Valaciclovir (J) 194. Valproic acid (N) 
195. Valsartan (C) 196. Venlafaxine (N) 
197. Verapamil (C) 198. Warfarin (B) 
199. Zolpidem (N) 200. Zopiclone (N) 
Note: The data included over-the-counter products, such as ibuprofen and paracetamol, if these were prescribed 
by a licensed health-care practitioner. The active ingredients listed in bold were available in at least one 
strength-form combination in each country. These 80 ingredients comprised the common sample analyzed in 
this paper. 
Source: IMS Health 2013 (Pricing Insights database); anatomical main groups from the WHOCC ATC/DDD 
Index (2015). 
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Appendix 2. Description of IMS Health data 
 
Prices 
 
IMS Health collects data on pack prices of medicines in European countries from 
validated sources, such as government price lists and wholesaler invoices. The company 
collects data at different levels of the distribution chain, based on data availability. IMS 
Health regularly — usually quarterly — audits price levels to obtain up-to-date price and 
volume data for each country. The company has internal quality assurance procedures. 
When data are unavailable at a level of the distribution chain, IMS Health adopts the 
same approach taken by national health ministries, or the relevant authorities, to calculate ex-
manufacturer and/or retail prices. In Spain, for example, IMS Health only collects data on 
retail prices, exclusive of value-added taxes, and then calculates ex-manufacturer prices 
based on official mark-ups regulated by the government (Table A).  
 
Table A. Price build-up of medicines in Spain (2013) 
Ex-manufacturer price (per pack) Corresponding wholesale mark-up 
€ 0 – 91.63 7.6% of the wholesale price 
€ 91.64 + €7.54 (flat fee) 
  
Ex-manufacturer price (per pack) Corresponding retail mark-up 
€ 0 – 91.63 27.9% of the retail price (excluding VAT) 
€ 91.64 – 200.00 €38.37 (flat fee) 
€ 200.01 – 500.00 €43.37 (flat fee) 
€ 500.01 + €48.37 (flat fee) 
VAT, value-added tax 
Source: IMS Health (2013). 
 
In some countries, IMS Health collects data on wholesale prices (i.e., prices charged 
by wholesalers to pharmacies), which they use to calculate ex-manufacturer and retail prices. 
For countries where distribution margins are unregulated, IMS Health estimates average 
margins, which can vary by product group. 
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Refer to IMS Health documentation for more information about data sources in each 
country. 
 
Sales 
 
IMS Health uses price and volume data to report aggregate sales, since a common 
denominator (e.g., doses) is needed to compare prices across drug forms and strengths. 
IMS Health calculates total sales of a product by multiplying the pack price by the 
number of packs sold (Table B). IMS Health relies on the latest price in a quarter. The 
company excludes value-added taxes to ensure comparability across countries. The sales 
figures do not reflect discounts, rebates, clawbacks, and other forms of confidential price 
reductions. 
 
Table B. Example calculations for one quarter 
Product Country 
Retail price 
per pack 
# of packs sold Sales calculation Total retail sales 
A Italy € 12.67 12750 12750 * 12.67 € 161,542.50 
B Sweden 15.50 kr 5000 5000 * 15.50 77,500.00 kr 
C U.K. £ 8.23 7934 7934 * 8.23 £ 65,296.82 
Source: IMS Health (2013).  
